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Does Belief in Ethical Subjectivism Pose a Challenge to 
Classical Liberalism?* 
By Niclas Berggren** 
________________________________________________________________ 
 
Abstract. Classical liberalism stresses the desirability of free markets, limited government and the rule of law. As 
such, it builds on some moral judgments. According to ethical objectivism, such judgments (in themselves 
always personal and subjective) can be true or false since objective moral facts exist against which the judgments 
can be assessed. Ethical subjectivism denies the existence of objective moral facts. This paper asks: Does it 
matter whether people believe that objective moral facts exist – in general and for a defense of classical 
liberalism? It is argued that the answer is in the negative. The implication for classical liberal strategy is that 
attempts to argue that a certain metaethical foundation is needed should be abandoned. 
 
 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
While classical liberals agree on many things, e.g. that free markets, limited government and 
the rule of law are necessary characteristics of any good society, they disagree about whether 
objective moral facts – i.e. extra-individual, mind-independent, true propositions as to what is 
right and wrong – exist and can be used to support their ideology. Some – here termed ethical 
objectivists – think such facts do exist, whereas others – here termed ethical subjectivists – 
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take the opposite position.
1 But does it really matter whether the one thing rather than the 
other is believed? Epstein (2003: 66) certainly thinks so, using the term moral relativism to 
denote the view that objective moral facts do not exist:  
 
There are, I think, three major intellectual trends that tend to undercut the viability of economic 
markets and the social and political institutions on which they depend. The first of these dangers 
is moral relativism, which disputes the capacity to make any kind of objective moral judgments 
about the relative soundness of alternative legal rules, not only in close cases, but in any case 
where someone refuses to acquiesce in the claims of his rivals. … Each line of attack represents 
a grave and misguided effort to undermine both the rule of law and the principle of individual 
liberty with which it is usually linked. (Italics in original.) 
 
Other scholars likewise argue for one particular metaethical view on the often implicit 
presumption that it, unlike other views, is important for an adequate defense of classical 
liberalism: see e.g. Lomasky (1979), Harman (1980), Mack (1981), Rothbard (1982), Machan 
(1989) and Rasmussen and Den Uyl (1991, 1998).
2 Many other classical liberal thinkers do 
not, to my knowledge, deal with the issue at all.
3 That is as it should be, in my view. The 
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thesis I shall argue in favor of is, namely, that it does not matter whether people believe that 
objective moral facts exist, neither in general nor – and especially not – for a defense of 
classical liberalism.
4 Alternatively put, unlike others I think that belief in ethical subjectivism 
does not pose a challenge to classical liberalism. Below, I shall specify in more detail what 
differing consequences different beliefs in this area could – but ultimately, I think, will not – 
entail. To the extent that this thesis holds, it implies that it is unwise to require of an argument 
for classical liberalism that it has a particular (or even that it has some) type of metaethical 
foundation. 
  The structure of the paper is as follows. In section 2, definitions of the central 
concepts used are offered, along with a discussion. Then, the main analysis is presented in 
section 3, with a detailed examination of claims to the effect that it matters what metaethical 
beliefs people have. Lastly, concluding remarks are offered. 
 
 




The most central concepts used are defined as follows:  
 
DEFINITION 2.1. A moral judgment is an expression of a subjective (i.e. intra-
individual, mind-dependent) proposition as to what is right and wrong. 
                                                      
4 For general arguments along somewhat similar lines, see Hare (1972) and Tännsjö (1974). For an opposite 
point of view, see Sturgeon (1986). Dworkin (1996) denies the relevance of metaethical analysis – he regards 
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DEFINITION 2.2. A moral fact is a true proposition as to what is right and wrong. 
An objective moral fact is an extra-individual, mind-independent, true proposition as to what 
is right and wrong. A subjective moral fact is an intra-individual, mind dependent, true 
proposition as to what is right and wrong.  
DEFINITION 2.3. A moral view is a moral judgment in conjunction with a set of 
non-moral factual assessments.  
DEFINITION 2.4. Ethical objectivism (EO) is the view that moral judgments can 
be objectively true or false since objective moral facts exist.  
DEFINITION 2.5. Ethical subjectivism (ES) is the view that moral judgments 
cannot be objectively true or false since objective moral facts do not exist, i.e. ~EO.  
DEFINITION 2.6. Ethical skepticism (ESk) is the view that objective moral facts 
cannot be known with any great degree of certainty, at least not by people in general.  
 
A few things need to be clarified before proceeding to the method of analysis.  
About definitions 2.1 and 2.2: The terms subjective and objective denote 
existence internal to or external to individual minds, respectively.
5 The proposition expressed 
by a moral judgment is a reflection of a feeling-state or a desire. A moral judgment is true 
when it is identical to a moral fact – be it objective or subjective. In the latter case, truth refers 
to a proposition as to what is right and wrong reflecting the individual’s feeling-state or desire 
correctly. Shafer-Landau (1998) clarifies that there are two mutually exclusive interpretations 
of ES: normative subjectivism, which entails holding that moral judgments can be true or false 
in the non-objective sense of accurately reporting the speaker’s feelings, and metaethical 
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subjectivism, which entails holding that moral judgments cannot be true or false in any sense. 
As noted, the former interpretation is the one opted for here. 
About definition 2.3: In conjunction with a set of factual assessments a moral 




       moral judgment   set of factual assessments 
 
Figure 1. The two components of a moral view 
 
About definition 2.4: On EO, a moral view can be false either if the moral judgment is 
incorrect, i.e. not in agreement with the objective moral facts, or if the set of factual 
assessments are incorrect, i.e. not in agreement with the non-moral facts. Also, there are other 
ways to define EO that do not invoke objective moral facts as defined here; see e.g. Scanlon 
(1998). To the extent that people actually think that collective manifestations of individual, 
subjective moral judgments under some circumstances entail objectivity, then this type of 
“EO,” which is strictly speaking a type of ES, could be treated as a type of real EO for 
analytical purposes. 
  About definition 2.5: On ES, a moral view can be false either if the moral 
judgment is incorrect, i.e. not in agreement with the subjective moral facts, or if the set of 
factual assessments are incorrect, i.e. not in agreement with the non-moral facts. 
About definition 2.6: In the analysis, I shall make use of at least a mild form of 
ESk, entailing that at least some non-trivial cases of moral dispute cannot be settled because 
convincing moral knowledge is missing.
6 On ES, this is because there are no objective moral 
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facts to be found; on EO, this is because moral agents are unable to properly perceive the 
objective moral facts (although they exist). The bases for this epistemological assumption is 
twofold: i) If this (or any stronger) form of ESk did not hold, it seems to me that it would be 
possible to know and demonstrate that certain, and not other, moral judgments were the 
correct ones – and this seems not to be the case (as argued by Ayer, 1967; cf. Posner, 2003, p. 
8); ii) If this assumption did not hold, it seems difficult to explain moral disagreement. It is 
quite clear that such disagreement exists and is nowhere near a solution. Take areas such as 
the death penalty, abortion, the treatment of animals, homosexuality, sex before marriage, 
war, euthanasia, cloning, narcotics sales, intoxication, taxation – and it will be obvious that 
severe and lasting moral disagreement exists, not only on facts but also when it comes to 
moral judgments. This conclusion is reinforced if we consider the existence of many 
incompatible ethical theories (such as consequentialist and deontological ones) which 
stipulate differing evaluative criteria for what is morally desirable. Note that to explain moral 
disagreement, I do not claim that ES is true (which is sometimes done) but that if EO is true, 
so is some form of ESk.
7  
Someone may retort that moral agreement does exist on many issues, and of 
course this is so (as in the case of whether it is morally right and wrong to set fire to a cat). 
But on ES, this can be explained in terms of intersubjectivity, i.e. that people’s feeling-states 
have converged, for biological, social/cultural or other reasons, in some quite basic cases – 
but not on many others. On EO, there is then an asymmetry present: certain moral truths can 
be apprehended whereas others cannot. An explanation is needed and, again, at least some 
mild form of ESk seems plausible. As will be outlined below, an alternative (or, really, 
complementary) explanation could be that people are de facto not able or willing to be 
governed by rational considerations in moral matters and that this may explain moral 
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disagreement.
8 It does not really matter for my argumentation what the reason is for people 
not observing objective moral facts. But below, my main comparison, in the end, will be 
between a belief in ES and a belief in EO in conjunction with (at least a mild form of) ESk.  
 
Method of Analysis 
 
The method of analysis is a simple form of the utility-function approach of economic theory. 
The approach is primarily used to facilitate a systematic and compact analysis.  
Assume the existence of a person called Claude Lester (henceforth referred to as 
CL) who is an ideal classical liberal. From the point of view of any classical liberal, CL is a 
perfectly representative and perfectly informed evaluator of various states of affairs.  
CL’s utility function can be expressed in the following manner: 
 
CL U  = f(C, I, E) 
 
where C = the content of people’s moral views, I = the intensity of people’s moral views, and 
E = the ability to evaluate moral views. These variables have been chosen as they are 
perceived to entail the most important potential consequences of people believing EO or ES to 
be true.  
CL’s goal is to obtain as high utility as possible with regard to the three 
variables; and it is assumed that these are the only variables that he cares about.
9 But what, 
more precisely, do they mean?  
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First, C refers to the content of first-order moral views. Some (perhaps most) 
such views are not relevant for CL, since he only cares about those that in some manner or 
form relate to his own set of moral views. But counting those, 
CL U  is higher the more people 
are in agreement with this particular set of views.  
Second, I refers to the intensity of the moral views people hold – and is thus a 
way of describing the character, rather than the content, of their first-order moral views. I is a 
continuous variable with a threshold value under which the intensity of a moral view is not 
strong enough to provide enough moral motivation to cause an individual to act in accordance 
with the view, and above which the intensity is strong enough for a morally induced act to 
take place. 
CL U is higher the more intense moral views relevant for and in line with CL’s set 
of moral views are, but lower the more intense moral views relevant for and out of line with 
this set of views are. 
Third, E refers to the ability to evaluate moral views, and 
CL U is higher the 
greater this ability is.  
Lastly,  EO
CL U is the utility of CL when people believe that EO is true and  ES
CL U as 
the utility of CL when people believe that ES is true. The hypothesis of this paper, and indeed 
a criterion for its main thesis, can then be expressed as  EO
CL U (C, I, E) =  ES
CL U (C, I, E).
10 
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CL U (C) = 
ES
CL U (C) in conjunction with 
EO
CL U (I) = 
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CL U (I), and 
EO
CL U (E) = 
ES
CL U (E). The difference between this and the criterion specified above is that the 
latter allows for differential effects of EO and ES on one or more of the three variables so long as the effects 
cancel each other out in utility space.    9
Hence, it should now be clear what is meant by the term matter in the rubric of this paper – 
i.e. for whom and in what way metaethical views may matter. It remains to be seen if they do. 
 
 
3.  CLAIMS 
 
This section contains three claims to the effect that it does matter for 
CL U  whether people 
believe that EO or ES is true.  
Claim Concerning C 
 
CLAIM 3.1. ”Without a belief in EO anything is permitted.”
11 
I take this to be the most common claim to the effect that it matters whether 
people hold EO or ES to be true. The idea is that EO ensures that beliefs and behavior that run 
counter to a desired first-order moral view can be minimized in scope. Without an ability to 
say that “x is objectively right” or “x is objectively wrong” we cannot influence people to 
think and act sufficiently morally. 
  But a first thing to note is that ES ≠ ethical nihilism (EN). That is, saying that 
objective moral facts do not exist and that moral judgments express propositions that are 
reflections of feeling-states of individuals is not the same as saying that moral judgments 
should not matter for anyone’s attitudes or behavior. Belief in ES certainly allows for moral 
judgments, and these may be identical in first-order moral content to the judgments expressed 
by someone adhering to EO – and, if EO is true, they may also be identical to the objective 
moral facts. This means that an ethical subjectivist can utter a statement of disapprobation of 
any act or phenomenon he deems to be immoral; that he can try to convince others, including 
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those prone on acting in ways he deems immoral, to embrace his views; and that he can 
actively try to forestall, prevent, stop and have punished acts that he deems immoral (but 
presumably, in the last case, only to the extent that these acts are also illegal; if they are not, 
he could try to make them so, even though it is by no means certain that CL would like many 
a thing deemed immoral illegal). As Hägerström (1939, p. 128) puts it:  
 
They commit the error of believing that emotional expressions and the ambition of influencing 
others through these are unjustified if it is not possible to claim the correspondence of one’s 
feelings with certain notions such as true judgments about reality. With the same authority it 
could then be said that it is not right to breathe or move. Breathing or moving are not judgments 
that could be said to be true or false either. Life entails much more than judgments. (Own 
translation.) 
 
Hence, an ethical subjectivist cannot in general be regarded as wanting to permit anything; in 
fact, he can readily have the exact same first-order moral views as an ethical objectivist. 
Schumpeter (1976, p. 243) echoes this insight: “To realize the relative validity of one’s own 
convictions and yet stand for them unflinchingly is what distinguishes a civilized man from a 
barbarian.” (Italics added.) 
  But, someone may counter, what if the ethical subjectivist’s ability to influence 
others’ moral views is smaller than that of the ethical objectivist, even if they hold identical 
moral views? If this holds, then it would matter for C and 
CL U  whether EO or ES is believed 
true, since CL cares about what first-order moral views people in general have. For it to hold, 
however, the mere addition of the word “objectively” to the phrase “x is wrong” must 
influence people’s moral thinking in some substantial way – and does it? Assume first that the 
listeners to this phrase believe ES to be true. In that case, adding the word makes no 
difference whatever to them.    11
Assume instead that the listeners believe EO to be true. If it is not true, then 
there is no way of demonstrating that a particular moral view is objectively right, even though 
it may be so called, and that means that the word is probably of no importance. In fact, in a 
setting with many claims about what constitutes an objective ethics, a general disbelief in 
anyone’s ability to discern the right ethics may very well spread, the effect of which will 
probably will be very similar to what obtains when people believe that ES is true.  
If EO is true and if people believe that it is, it is required, for the claim to hold, 
that 
 
i)  they must make be able to observe the objective moral facts just like the 
propagandist, and 
ii)  they must be willing to adopt the observable objective moral facts as their own 
moral judgments.  
 
This needs some further elaboration.  
  On the first point: If objective moral facts exist they can still be unobservable (at 
least to people in general), and if so, much the same thing can be expected as in the case of 
people believing ES to be true and as in the case of people believing EO to be true when it is 
false. In a setting with competing claims, how could the term objective per se offer 
convincing moral guidance? 
  In this context, it should be pointed out that there is a distinct risk involved 
when using objectivity as an argument, if the unique moral truth cannot be identified in a 
rational manner understandable to people in general (either because ES is true or because EO 
is true in conjunction with objective moral facts not being observable). If (which, as argued 
here, is probably not the case) the usage of this term makes people more prone to change their   12
moral views, there is no guarantee, from the point of view of the moral propagandist, that his 
listeners will change their views in his direction – 
CL U  could in fact then decrease if 
people’s C changes as a result of, say, a communist arguing that his views are implied on EO 
(this idea is explored further below, as something that also affects I).  
  On the second point: Even if objective moral facts exist and even if they are 
observable, people may not be willing to adopt them as their moral judgments. Both an ethical 
subjectivist and an ethical objectivist can hold that all moral judgments are based on feeling-
states. It may be that these feeling-states induce people to hold the objective moral facts as 
moral judgments – but it may just as well be that the feeling-states induce them to hold moral 
judgments at odds with the objective moral facts. That is, moral motivation may not 
primarily, or at all, be derived from reason (i.e. what rational considerations dictate) but from 
people’s feeling-states. Acknowledging the existence of facts is another matter than being 
governed by facts. As Russell (1950) noted: 
 
All human activity is prompted by desire. There is a wholly fallacious theory, advanced by some 
earnest moralists, to the effect that it is possible to resist desire in the interest of duty and moral 
principle. I say this is fallacious, not because no man ever acts from a sense of duty, but because 
duty has no hold on him unless he desires to be dutiful. If you wish to know what men will do, 
you must know not only or principally their material circumstances, but rather their whole 
system, of their desires with their relative strengths. 
 
Whatever the metaethical foundation of ethics, desires or feeling-states bring about moral 
judgments, motivation and action (although cognitive abilities, the use of logic for   13
consistency purposes and beliefs about the world naturally also play a role and enables 
rational analysis of a certain kind also in moral matters).
12  
  The argument is summarized in Figure 2. It shows a number of alternative 
situations that may hold for a listener to some EO-based moral rhetoric, the purpose of which 
is to make him adopt the moral view presented by the speaker.  
 
willingness to adopt objective moral 
facts Æ effect (2) 
              believes ES Æ no effect (1) 
                                                                                objective moral facts observable 
 
willingness to adopt moral judgments 
at odds with objective moral facts Æ 
                                                  EO true                            no effect (3) 
 
 
              believes EO                                              




                                                    EO false Æ no effect (5) 
 
Figure 2. The partial effect on a listener’s moral views of adding only the term objective to a moral argument 
 
Note that the figure only looks at the partial effect of adding an objectivity component to a 
moral argument, which means that there may still be a total effect of the moral argument even 
where the figure lists “no effect.” Also note that even if a person is willing to accept some 
moral argument and regard it as objective, the argument here, not least at nodes (4) and (5), is 
that the acceptance of any moral argument is not always enhanced solely by the inclusion of 
the term “objective.” Now, as is clear in Figure 2, quite a few conditions have to be met in 
                                                      
12 Binmore (1994, 1998) strongly criticizes the approach of moral philosophers who think that moral judgments 
are formed as the result of mere reasoning. The emerging literature on evolutionary psychology offers similar 
ideas, that moral views are formed through evolutionary processes that have little or nothing to do with rational 
evaluation: see e.g. Barkow, Cosmides and Toby (1992), Wright (1994), Pinker (1997), Ruse and Wilson (1997) 
and Dennett (2003, ch. 7). Cf. Ayer (1967), Hume (1984, book II, part iii, section 3), Mackie (1980, chapters III, 
IV) and Björnsson (1998, 2002).   14
order for there to be an effect. The probable situation in reality is that all these do not hold and 
that there is no, or at least a small, effect. Thus, whether one adheres to EO or ES does not 
seem to matter for C in the sense that one can hold the same first-order moral views and one 
can influence others in a similar manner irrespective of which metaethical beliefs people hold. 
As noted by Russell (1935, pp. 254-255): 
 
Whatever our definition of the ‘Good,’ and whether we believe it to be subjective or objective, 
those who do not desire the happiness of mankind will not endeavor to further it, while those 
who do desire it will do what they can to bring it about. (Italics added; cf. Rorty, 1999: 83-84, 
and Blackburn, 2001.) 
 
Claim Concerning I 
 
CLAIM 3.2. “On a belief in EO, moral views are taken more seriously.” 
Williams (1973, p. 219) states the following: 
 
It cannot be denied that an intrinsic feature of moral thought are the distinctions between taking 
a serious view and a less serious view; having strong convictions and less strong convictions, 
and so forth. It would be a mark of insanity to regard all moral issues as on the same level.  
 
That is to say, a certain, given moral content C may be embraced more or less strongly. In 
fact, I can be regarded as a continuous variable, and at some point, this intensity is sufficiently 
strong to turn into a moral motivation for action. This is an analysis of the character of moral 
views rather than of their content. 
The claim here is that even if someone who believes in ES and someone who 
believes in EO have the exact same first-order moral views, the latter will embrace them more   15
strongly and be more motivated to act upon them. This, however, seems dubious – and also 
like a risky way of thinking for CL.
13 
First: As has been argued above in the context of the content of moral views, 
adding the concept of objectivity scarcely makes a certain view more attractive to others. This 
is because moral judgments are not per se determined through reflections in metaethics but 
through the feeling-states of individuals. It appears even more reasonable to think the 
intensity of moral views the result of feeling-states.  
Second: Assume now that people may have different first-order moral views, 
that the argument that belief in EO better ensures intense adherence to some first-order ethics 
in fact holds, that ES or EO is true and that if EO is true, some non-negligible epistemological 
imperfection is present (i.e. ESk obtains in some way). Here, a risk is involved. The risk is 
that some other first-order ethics than the one favored by oneself is adopted. This is illustrated 
in Figure 3. 
 
  People believe that ethical 
subjectivism is true 
People believe that ethical 
objectivism is true 
Good first-order ethics  1
CL U  
2
CL U  
Bad first-order ethics  3
CL U  
4
CL U  
 
Figure 3. Combinations of first-order moral views and metaethical beliefs in the general population 
 
The following utility relationship then holds: 
2
CL U > 
1
CL U > 
3
CL U > 
4
CL U . That is, the best 
outcome is when people agree with CL and do so more intensely; and the worst outcome is 
when they disagree with CL and do so more intensely. Now, either people believe in ES or 
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they believe in EO. In each of these two mutually exclusive cases, there is a probability for 
them sympathizing with CL and a residual probability for them sympathizing with ~CL. 
Hence, the risk arises because there is no way of knowing which of the two options yields the 
highest expected 
CL U . Is p(good first-order ethics) *  1
CL U + p(bad first-order ethics) *  3
CL U  
larger than, smaller than or equal to p(good first-order ethics) *  2
CL U + p(bad first-order 
ethics) *  4
CL U ? This way of reasoning is, as a rule, overlooked: people who perform this type 
of analysis simply presume that if EO is believed, then their particular form of first-order 
moral views will automatically be accepted. That is naïve, at best. 
 
Claim Concerning E 
 
CLAIM 3.3. “On a belief in ES, moral views cannot be questioned objectively.” 
If objective moral facts do not exist and moral judgments really are nothing but 
reflections of feeling-states, how can a moral view ever be legitimately questioned? How can 
a moral conflict be resolved? De gustibus non est disputandum? As Shafer-Landau (1998) 
puts it: 
 
If our ethical attachments are ultimately entirely up to us, with no supporting reasons 
needed, and no rationally compelling ones available, then our moral views are 
arbitrary. 
 
I think this view is largely mistaken, for four reasons.  
  First, assessments of facts can be analyzed. Any moral view consists of a moral 
judgment and a set of factual assessments, and even if the compatibility of the former with   17
objective facts cannot be assessed, the latter can be.
14 Hence, if two people have different 
moral views, this is either the result of their having different moral judgments or of their 
having made different factual assessments as to what means should be applied to achieve the 
goal(s) determined by the moral judgment(s).
15 Take, as an example, a person whose moral 
view is that Asians should not be allowed to vote, whose moral judgment is that people who 
are unintelligent should not be allowed to vote and whose set of factual assessments are based 
on the writings of the National Enquirer. Upon encountering a person who (for the sake of 
argument) agrees with his moral judgment but disagrees with his moral view, he is presented 
with facts in the form of scientific studies that show that Asians are, indeed, more intelligent 
than the average person – and as a result, he revises his moral view. 
  Second, standards of logical consistency can be applied to identify and resolve 
inconsistencies in a person’s set of moral views.  
  Third, there is another way, hitherto rather overlooked in metaethical 
discussions, in which I think an evaluation of moral judgments is possible on a belief in ES.
16 
To demonstrate this, I will make use of Hare’s (1981, ch. 2) idea of there being two levels of 
moral thinking, the intuitive and the critical levels, but in a slightly different way than he 
does. The intuitive level refers to the way we think morally in familiar and everyday 
situations without deeper reflection. The critical level refers to the way we (could) think 
morally about non-familiar situations or about situations of internal moral conflict. Now, the 
argument I would like to put forth says that the propositions being expressed in moral 
                                                      
14 Cf. Blackburn (1971, p. 122). 
15 Russell (1992, p. 349) asserts: “Perhaps there is not, strictly speaking, any such thing as ‘scientific’ ethics. It is 
not the province of science to decide on the ends of life. Science can show that an ethic is unscientific, in the 
sense that it does not minister to any desired end.” 
16 Cf. LaFollette (1991).    18
judgments, being reflections of individuals’ feeling-states,
17 are generally the result of 
thinking at the intuitive level – but they can be questioned at the critical level by asking: How 
did they come about? That is, feeling-states are not taken for granted but are scrutinized using 
rational analysis, bringing factual knowledge about the emergence of feeling-states to bear 
upon the relevance of the moral judgments themselves. 
  One can imagine at least four (often mutually reinforcing) sources of feeling-
states, viz. biological evolution, social evolution/culture, methods of upbringing and illness. 
The point is that each of these sources can result in feeling-states that can be questioned on 
rational and factual grounds. Biological evolution may have given rise to feeling-states that 
facilitated survival in some setting but which are not relevant in another. This could concern 
attitudes towards phenomena such as people different to oneself,
18 certain economic and 
political issues,
19 certain animals perceived to be dangerous and certain actions.
20 To take an 
example in this area, if a person experiences a feeling-state to the effect that he should acquire 
as many material possessions as possible, this may be realized to be a remnant of an era when 
gathering food etc. was a direct matter of survival; in modern days, it might yield higher 
utility on net to spend more time with family and friends. Hence, the feeling-state that directs 
a person to amass things in absurdum can be questioned on a critical level. Or, to take another 
example used by Hayek (1978), if a person experiences a feeling-state to the effect that 
egalitarian policies, incorporating massive redistribution among citizens, should be pursued, it 
may be that its basis is to be located to an evolutionary stage when people lived in small, 
                                                      
17 These propositions could be at odds with the subjective moral facts (i.e. the feeling-states or desires), but that 
type of conflict is assumed away at present. 
18 Cf. Hayek (1978). 
19 Cf. Rubin (2002). 
20 Cf. Thornhill and Palmer (2000).   19
communal bands. Today’s modern, complex society may be quite unsuited for the same rules 
as the ones originating in a completely different setting. 
Social evolution/culture can influence moral judgments through memes quite 
quickly, either with an originally biological basis or with roots in some cultural propagandist, 
whose feeling-states may have been suitable to a certain setting quite different from the 
present one. These judgments can likewise be questioned, e.g. after having become 
internalized by many persons. To take an example, the Nazi moral judgments, with lower 
worth put on some categories of people, were probably internalized by many Germans, 
inducing them to support persecutions of various kinds. Realizing that these judgments 
stemmed from a small group of ideologues, and that perhaps popular sentiment was receptive 
to these judgments due to biological –and not generally rational – factors, inducing them with 
a propensity to regard strangers with skepticism, could enable a person to question feeling-
states of hatred. 
Methods of upbringing, to the extent that they propagate moral judgments, 
simply reflect the feeling-states of parents, family, teachers and other guardians. What reason 
is there to think these persons’ feeling-states especially appealing? They may simply reflect 
the particular circumstances of their upbringing (and so on, going back in time). To take an 
example, assume that a person knows that his parents never once left their hometown and that 
they harbored virulent feelings of hatred towards anyone not stemming from their particular 
part of the world. Upon having moved to a big city, the person experiences feelings of intense 
dislike upon encountering persons with a different color of the skin. But realizing that these 
feeling-states were induced by his parents attitudes, in turn shaped by the particular way they 
lived their lives (reinforced by evolutionary psychology to some degree), he is able, upon 
critical reflection, to question his own feelings and judgments and downplay the ones he finds 
are without rational basis.   20
  Illness is a fourth source of certain feeling-states, in particular various forms of 
mental problems. If the individual affected can be made to realize that he in fact suffers from 
some objective condition which influence his emotional set-up, he can also, on purely factual 
grounds, be made to see that all feeling-states and related moral judgments that he experiences 
are not to be relied on without further reflection.  
Now, on this view, it is still not possible to say, on a belief in ES, that a person’s 
moral judgments are objectively false – but it is possible to say that they are inapplicable (as 
the underlying feeling-states are irrelevant for the setting in which the person now lives his 
life) and should actively be resisted and preferably abandoned as a basis for moral views and 
action. However, if a person, upon reflecting critically in this manner (on his own or as a 
result of listening to or reading others) does not want to alter the internal priorities of his 
emotional set-up or eradicate some recurring feeling-state (a want that in itself, of course, 
would be the result of a feeling-state), then there is nothing more that can be done.
21 
  How do these three possibilities of evaluation of moral views on a belief in ES 
compare to a situation where people believe in EO? The presumption in the claim addressed 
here is that in the latter situation, a rational evaluation of moral judgments is possible (as 
these can be compared to objective moral facts that can be shown to be true or false). But if 
EO is in fact false, or if EO is true but objective moral facts are not observable with any 
degree of certainty, then a situation very similar to that when people believe ES to be true 
obtains – i.e. because there are not objective moral facts, or because these cannot be 
identified, no more rational argumentation is possible than when people believe ES to be true. 
If people believe EO to be true, if it is true and if objective moral facts are observable, then 
                                                      
21 Perhaps it is the case, if our moral judgments reflect feeling-states brought about by biological evolution, that 
we cannot change them through critical moral thinking. But if this is so, it is so irrespective of metaethical 
beliefs.   21
rational argumentation in the purer sense is possible, but again, the assumption of 
observability seems optimistic at best – as does, perhaps, the assumption that there is a 
willingness for moral agents to adopt objective moral facts as their own moral judgments. 
From the viewpoint of CL, then, it seems as if it does not really matter whether people believe 




4.  CONCLUSIONS 
 
Many argue in favor of EO or ES as if it really matters what people believe in this realm of 
affairs. Here, I have tried to find out whether this supposition is, in fact, true. By looking at 
three distinct claims, concerning how the three variables of the utility function of CL are 
affected, the following has been found: 
 
i) On  C: The content of moral views need not and probably does not differ between 
believers in EO and believers in ES; and it is improbable that one’s ability to 
influence the moral views of others depends on whether they believe EO or ES to 
be true.  
ii) On  I: The intensity of moral views need not and probably does not differ between 
believers in EO and believers in ES; and even if it does, such that believers in EO 
hold their moral views more strongly, there is a risk that they hold “bad” moral 
views, which may render belief in ES just as preferable on net. 
                                                      
22 Thereby, Sturgeon’s (1986) argument (really about P), that a believer in EO can be expected to be more 
humble than a believer in ES, as the former allows for errors in his moral judgments (i.e. he regards them as 
fallible), seems to fall.   22
iii) On  E: The ability to evaluate moral views is probably as great on a belief in ES as 
on a belief in EO. 
 
Hence, as there is no reason to expect there to be different effects of a belief in EO compared 
to a belief in ES on the individual variables of CL’s utility function, there is naturally no 
reason to expect the overall utility level to differ depending on people’s metaethical beliefs in 
this area. However, should one come to a different conclusion and think that a belief in EO 
affects one or more of the three components in a different manner than a belief in ES, it may 
still be that the different effects cancel each other out such that  EO
CL U (C, I, E) =  ES
CL U (C, I, E) 
after all. In all, ES does not, in spite of many claims to the contrary, pose a particularly great 
challenge to or undermine cherished moral views. 
The implication of this is clear: advocates of a certain set of first-order moral 
views, such as classical liberalism, should cease trying to construct and present arguments as 
to the metaethical basis of these views and concentrate on instilling interest in and support for 
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